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Abstract
An increasing body of empirical evidence suggests that cooperation among clone-mates is common in bacteria. Bacterial
cooperation may take the form of the excretion of ‘‘public goods’’: exoproducts such as virulence factors, exoenzymes or
components of the matrix in biofilms, to yield significant benefit for individuals joining in the common effort of producing
them. Supposedly in order to spare unnecessary costs when the population is too sparse to supply the sufficient
exoproduct level, many bacteria have evolved a simple chemical communication system called quorum sensing (QS), to
‘‘measure’’ the population density of clone-mates in their close neighborhood. Cooperation genes are expressed only above
a threshold rate of QS signal molecule re-capture, i.e., above the local quorum of cooperators. The cooperative population is
exposed to exploitation by cheaters, i.e., mutants who contribute less or nil to the effort but fully enjoy the benefits of
cooperation. The communication system is also vulnerable to a different type of cheaters (‘‘Liars’’) who may produce the QS
signal but not the exoproduct, thus ruining the reliability of the signal. Since there is no reason to assume that such cheaters
cannot evolve and invade the populations of honestly signaling cooperators, the empirical fact of the existence of both
bacterial cooperation and the associated QS communication system seems puzzling. Using a stochastic cellular automaton
approach and allowing mutations in an initially non-cooperating, non-communicating strain we show that both
cooperation and the associated communication system can evolve, spread and remain persistent. The QS genes help
cooperative behavior to invade the population, and vice versa; cooperation and communication might have evolved
synergistically in bacteria. Moreover, in good agreement with the empirical data recently available, this synergism opens up
a remarkably rich repertoire of social interactions in which cheating and exploitation are commonplace.
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Introduction
Cooperation – behavior that benefits other individuals – is not
easy to explain from an evolutionary perspective, because of its
potential vulnerability to selfish cheating. A classic example is
formed by the so-called tragedy of the commons [1]. A commons
pasture is used by many herders, and the best strategy for an
individual herder is to add as many cattle as possible, even if this
eventually causes degradation of the pasture. The unfortunate
outcome follows from the fact that the division of the costs and
benefits of adding additional animals is unequal: the individual
herder gains all of the advantage, but the disadvantage is shared
among all herders using the pasture. Therefore, although
cooperation (involving restraint in the input of animals) among
the herders would yield the highest benefit for them as a group,
each individual herder will be tempted to cheat by adding
additional animals, causing the cooperation to break down.
The basis for evolutionary explanations of cooperation is
provided by Hamilton’s inclusive fitness (kin selection) theory
[2]. Individuals gain inclusive fitness through their impact on their
own reproduction (direct fitness effects) as well as through their
impact on the reproduction of related individuals (indirect fitness
effects) (see also [3]). Altruistic cooperative behavior (costly to the
actor and beneficial to the recipient) can only be explained by
indirect fitness effects. By helping a close relative reproduce, an
individual is indirectly passing copies of its genes on to the next
generation.
Another theoretical approach considers the evolution of
cooperation in terms of two-level selection, namely between and
within groups, rather than partitioning individual fitness into
direct and indirect components. Cooperation is favored when the
response to between-group selection is greater than the response to
within-group selection. From yet another perspective, altruism will
be favored by natural selection if carriers of altruistic genotypes are
sufficiently overcompensated for their altruistic sacrifice by
benefits they receive from others. In other words, there should
be assortment between altruists and the helping behaviors of
others [4]. Perhaps the most likely mechanism for such assortment
is ‘population viscosity’ (limited dispersal), causing the offspring of
cooperators to remain spatially associated. These different
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6655theoretical approaches do not contradict each other but emphasize
different aspects of altruistic behavior [5,6,4].
Although most studies of cooperation have been done on
animals, there is a fast growing new field of socio-microbiology
studying cooperative behaviors performed by microorganisms
[7,8,9,10]. Consider a population of bacteria, in which individual
cells are producing some public good. Public goods are costly to
produce and provide a benefit to all the individuals in the local
group. Examples of public goods are exoproducts like virulence
factors damaging the host, enzymes for the digestion of food
sources, surfactants for facilitating movement, and nutrient
scavenging molecules such as siderophores. In many instances
microbial cooperation is regulated by quorum sensing.
Quorum sensing (QS) involves the secretion by individual cells
of ‘signaling’ molecules. When the local concentration of these
molecules has reached a threshold, the cells respond by switching
on particular genes. In this way individual cells can sense the local
density of bacteria, so that the population as a whole can make a
coordinated response. In many situations bacterial activities, such
as the production of the mentioned public goods, are only
worthwhile as a joint activity by a sufficient number of
collaborators. Regulation by QS would allow the cells to express
appropriate behavior only when it is effective, thus saving
resources under low density conditions. Therefore, QS has been
interpreted as a bacterial communication system to coordinate
behaviors at the population level [11,12]. However, its evolution-
ary stability is somewhat problematic, since cooperative commu-
nication is vulnerable to cheating. For example, a signal-negative
(mute) strain does not have to pay the metabolic cost of signal
production, and a signal-blind (deaf) strain does not pay the cost of
responding. Both type of mutants may still benefit from public
goods produced in their neighborhood and have actually been
observed among environmental and clinical isolates [13,14] The
question then is, under what conditions cheating strains will
increase to such an extent that QS breaks down as a regulatory
system of cooperative behavior – perhaps with the consequence
that the cooperative behavior itself cannot be maintained.
Brookfield [15] and Brown & Johnstone [16] have analysed
models of the evolution of bacterial quorum sensing. Although
differing in modelling approach, both have studied the evolution of
QS in the context of explicit 2-level selection, where selection at the
indidual level operates against cooperation, while selection at the
group level favors QS. These studies conclude that under fairly broad
conditions either stable polymorphism may arise in bacterial
populations between strains that exhibit QS and strains that do not
[15] or the average resource investment into quorum signalling takes
positive values, the actual investment depending on group size and
within-group relatedness [16]. Since kin selection appears to be central
for the evolution of altruistic cooperation, it is required that
cooperation preferentially takes place among related individuals. As
Hamilton [2] suggested, this could be brought about either by kin
discrimination or by limited dispersal. The first mechanism may play
some role in microbial communities, for example if a public good
produced by a specific strain can only be utilized by clonemates [10].
However, limited dispersal is probably much more important in
microbes because due to the clonal reproduction mode it would tend
to keep close relatives together. This implies that the spatial population
structure plays a key role in the evolution of bacterial cooperation.
In a previous work [17] we have analyzed the evolutionary
stability of QS using a cellular automaton approach, which is
eminently suitable to investigate the role of spatial population
structure. There we asked whether QS could be stable as a
regulatory mechanism of bacteriocin (anti-competitor toxin)
production, and concluded that it could be maintained only when
the competing strains were unrelated, and not when the
bacteriocin is aimed at related strains which can share the
signaling and responding genes involved in QS.
Here, we analyze a much more general model of the evolution of
QS regulated cooperation, again using the cellular automaton (CA)
approach. In fact, QS regulated cooperation can be viewed as a
superposition and interaction between two cooperative behaviors:the
cooperative QS communication system which coordinates another
cooperative behavior (e.g. production of a public good). Both forms of
cooperation are potentially vulnerable to being parasitized by
cheating strains. We allow the reward and the cost of cooperation,
the level of dispersal and the sensitivity of the QS system (the signal
strength required to induce production of a public good) to vary, and
ask for which parameter combinations cooperation and QS will
evolve and be maintained, to what extent the presence ofa QS system
affectsthe evolution and maintenance of cooperation, how vulnerable
the system is for social cheating and how equilibrium levels of QS and
cooperation depend on the parameter values.
Methods
The model we use is a two-dimensional cellular automaton (CA)
of toroidal lattice topology. Each of the 3006300 grid-points of the
square lattice represent a site for a single bacterium; all the sites
are always occupied, i.e., bacteria may replace each other, but
may not leave empty sites. The inhabitants of the sites may differ
at 3 genetic loci: locus C for cooperation (production of a public
good), the other two for quorum sensing: locus S for producing the
signal molecule and locus R for signal response, which includes the
signal receptor and the signal transduction machinery that triggers
the cooperative behaviour when the critical signal concentration
has been reached. Each of these loci can harbour either a
functional allele denoted by a capital letter (C, S and R), or an
inactive allele denoted by a small letter (c, s, and r). Thus the
bacteria can have 2
3=8 different genotypes, each paying its own
metabolic cost of allele expression on the 3 loci (Table 1) besides
the basic metabolic burden M0 that is carried by all individuals.
Fitness effects of cooperation: The product of the cooperating C
allele is supposed to be an excreted ‘public good’ molecule such as
an exo-enzyme for extracellular food digestion. It may increase the
fitness of a bacterium, provided there are at least nq bacteria
(possibly, but not necessarily, including itself) expressing the C
allele as well within its 363-cell neighbourhood; nq is the quorum
Table 1. The 8 possible genotypes of the cooperation-quorum
sensing systemandthe corresponding totalmetabolic costsme
of gene expression.
GENOTYPE PHENOTYPE
Total cost me
(with mc=30.0)
Total cost me
(with mc=10.0)
csr ‘‘Ignorant’’ 0.0 0.0
csR ‘‘Voyeur’’ 1.0 1.0
cSr ‘‘Liar’’ 3.0 3.0
cSR ‘‘Lame’’ 4.0 4.0
Csr ‘‘Blunt’’ 30.0 10.0
CsR ‘‘Shy’’ 31.0 11.0
CSr ‘‘Vain’’ 33.0 13.0
CSR ‘‘Honest’’ 34.0 14.0
Cooperation can be costly (mc=30.0; left column) or relatively cheap (mc=10.0;
right column). Cost of QS signalling: ms=3.0; Cost of QS response: mr=1.0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006655.t001
Cooperation and Cheating
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benefit from cooperative behaviour in its neighbourhood if at least
nq cooperators are present in that neighbourhood. On the other
hand, cooperation carries a fitness cost which is always paid by the
cooperator whether or not it enjoys the benefits of cooperation.
The cost of cooperation is the metabolic burden associated with
the production of the public good. That is, cooperation (expressing
C) carries an inevitable fitness cost and a conditional fitness
benefit. We study the effects of a high as well as a low cost of
cooperation. Of course for cooperation to be feasible at all the
benefit has to outweigh the cost.
Fitness effects of quorum sensing
Cells carrying genotype.S. (for the genotype notation, see
Table 1) produce the quorum signal molecule, whereas R
genotypes will respond to a sufficient amount of signal in their
immediate environment. Both the expression of S and of R imply
a fitness cost as well, because producing the signal and running the
response machinery takes metabolic resources, although less than
cooperation itself [18,13]. The fitness benefit of a QS system is an
indirect one: communication using a signalling system may spare
unnecessary costs of futile attempts to cooperate whenever the
local density of potential cooperators is lower than the quorum nq.
For this communication benefit to be feasible, the QS machinery
altogether has to be much cheaper (in terms of metabolic costs)
than cooperation itself, otherwise constitutive (unconditional and
permanent) cooperation would be a better option for the
bacterium, and resources invested into QS would be wasted.
Thus the ordering of the metabolic fitness costs of cooperation and
QS are assumed to be mCwwmS§mR. The inactive alleles c, s
and r carry no metabolic cost: mc~ms~mr~0:
The effect of the quorum sensing genes on the
cooperation gene
The quorum signal is supposed to be the regulator of
cooperation: bacteria with a C.R genome (i.e., those carrying a
functional cooperation allele C and a working response module R)
will actually express the C gene (i.e., cooperate) only if there is a
sufficient quorum nq of signallers (.S. individuals) within their
neighbourhood. That is, C.R cells wait for a number of
‘‘promises’’ of cooperation in their 363-cell neighbourhood before
they switch to cooperating mode (produce the public good)
themselves. C.r genotypes do not have a functioning response
module, therefore they produce the public good constitutively.
Selection
Individuals compete for sites. Competition is played out
between randomly chosen pairs of neighbouring cells, on the
basis of the actual net metabolic burdens M(1) and M(2) they
carry. The net metabolic burden M(i) of an individual i is
calculated as the sum of the basic metabolic load M0 carried by all
individuals and the total metabolic cost me(i) of the actual gene
expressions at the three loci concerned (see Table 1), multiplied by
the unit complement of the cooperation reward parameter (1 – r)i f
it is surrounded by a sufficient quorum of cooperators:
Mi ðÞ ~ M0zme i ðÞ ½  if # of cooperators in neighborhood
is below the quorum threshold nq
Mi ðÞ ~ M0zme i ðÞ ½  1{r ðÞ otherwise 0vrv1 ðÞ
Thus, successful cooperation reduces the total metabolic burden
in a multiplicative fashion. The relative fitness of individual i is
defined as its net metabolic burden relative to the basic metabolic
load as M0=Mi ðÞ . In practice, the outcome of competition is
determined by a random draw, with chances of winning weighted
in proportion to the relative fitnesses. The winner takes the site of
the loser, replacing it by a copy of itself.
Mutations
During the takeover of a site by the winner of the competition
the invading cell, i.e., the copy of the winner occupying the site of
the loser, can change one of its 3 alleles (chosen at random) from
functional to inactive or vice versa. We call these allele changes
‘‘mutations’’, but in fact they can be due to either mutation or
some other process like transformation or even the immigration of
individuals carrying the ‘‘mutant’’ allele. The point in allowing
allele changes both ways (losing and obtaining them) is to maintain
the presence of all six different genes (C, c, S, s, R, r) in the
population so that the system doesn’t get stuck in any particular
genetic state because of the lack of alternative alleles. Thus, each of
the six possible allele changes may have a positive probability.
Mutations are independent at the three loci – e.g., the quorum
signal gene S can be lost without losing the response module R at
the same time; the resulting mutant will be ‘‘mute’’ yet still able to
respond to quorum signals.
Diffusion
Each competition step may be followed by a number (D)o f
diffusion steps. One diffusion step consists of the random choice of
a site, and the 90u rotation of the 262 subgrid with the randomly
chosen site in its upper left corner. Rotation occurs in clockwise or
anticlockwise direction with equal probability [19]. D is the
diffusion parameter of the model: it is proportional to the average
number of diffusion steps taken by a cell per each competitive
interaction it is engaged in. Larger D means faster mixing in the
population. Since one diffusion move involves 4 cells, D=1.0
amounts to an expected number of 4 diffusion steps per interaction
per cell. In the simulations we use the range 0.0#D#1.0 of the
diffusion parameter, and occasionally much higher values
(D=15.0) as well.
Initial states and output
At t=0 the lattice is ‘‘seeded’’ either by the ‘‘Ignorant’’ (csr)
genotype on all sites, or the initial state is a random pattern of all
the 8 possible genotypes present at equal proportions. We simulate
pairwise competitive interactions, mutations and diffusive move-
ments for N generations. One generation consists of a number of
competition steps equal to the number of sites in the lattice, so that
each site is updated once per generation on average. In the
majority of simulations we have applied mutation rates of 10
24
both ways at each locus, which is equivalent to an average of 9
mutation events per generation within the whole habitat. The
three functional alleles have a positive cost of expression,
constrained by the relation mCwwmSwmR (the actual values
used throughout the simulations are given in Table 1).
Simulations
With the initial conditions specified above we follow the
evolution (the change in allele frequencies) for both cooperation
and the two components of quorum sensing. We investigate the
qualitative or quantitative effects on the evolution of cooperation
and quorum sensing of the crucial parameters of the model: the
fitness reward of cooperation (r), the metabolic cost of cooperation
(mC), the intensity of diffusive mixing (D) and the quorum
threshold (nq). The simulations have been run until the relative
Cooperation and Cheating
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quasi-stationary values. This could be achieved within 10.000
generations in most cases. The first few simulations have been
repeated 3 times with each parameter setting, using different
random number arrays, but since variation in the results was very
small at a lattice size of 3006300 in all cases, and each run took a
long time to finish, we stopped producing replicate runs.
During the simulations we record and plot the time series of the
8 different genotype frequencies, from which the frequencies of the
three functional alleles can be calculated and plotted against time.
Evaluation of the model outputs
The simulation results are recorded as 10.000-generation time
series of genotype frequencies and spatial patterns of the
genotypes. With regard to allele frequencies we asked the following
question: are the genes for cooperation (C) and quorum sensing (S
and R) selected for beyond their respective mutation-selection
equilibria based on the metabolic selection coefficients sC=(MC
2M0)/MC,s S=(MS 2M0)/MS and sR=(MR 2M0)/MR and the
(uniform) mutation rate m ? For example, relative frequencies of
the cooperating allele above its mutation-selection equilibrium
^ q qC~m= sCzm ðÞ indicate a net fitness benefit of cooperation and
thus positive selection for the C allele. ^ q qS and ^ q qR can be
calculated the same way.
Results
The evolution of cooperation without quorum sensing
We first have performed simulations with the QS functions
disabled (mutation rates in both ways set to 0.0 at the S and the R
loci). Without QS allowed, the only possible genotypes are the
‘‘Ignorant’’ (no cooperation) and the ‘‘Blunt’’ (unconditional
cooperation), of course.
(1) cooperation is relatively costly (mc=30)
The left column in Fig. 1 summarizes the results. Cooperation is
only selected under a very low degree of dispersal. This confirms
the essential role played by kin selection in the evolution of
cooperation, since low dispersal in a microbial population implies
that most social interactions are among related individuals. With a
low quorum threshold (only few cooperators are necessary to
provide the benefit to all the immediate neighbors) there is much
scope for non-cooperators to parasitize, because sufficiently often
they can enjoy the benefit from cooperative neighbors without
paying the cost of cooperation themselves; therefore, with nq=2
and nq=3, only a minority of the population will consist of
cooperator genotypes. With nq=4 and nq=5 there is obviously
less opportunity for parasitism, and cooperators reach higher
frequencies. However, then the system becomes more sensitive to
the effects of spatial mixing; with nq=6 even at D=0 successfully
cooperating neighborhoods are disintegrated more often than that
they are formed or maintained, and cooperative behavior is no
longer selected.
(2) cooperation is relatively cheap (mc=10)
Qualitatively the same trends are apparent when cooperation is
less costly (Fig. 1, right column). Cooperation is maintained over a
broader range of diffusion rates, compared to the case of costly
cooperation. Clearly, with less costly cooperation, occasional futile
cooperation attempts (when the number of cooperators in a
neighbourhood is less than the quorum) are less deleterious. With
increasing quorum threshold the scope for parasitism by non-
cooperators becomes smaller and as a consequence a larger
fraction of the population will consist of cooperators, as long as
neighborhoods sufficiently often contain at least a quorum of
cooperators. Above a certain level of population mixing this is no
longer the case, and then cooperation does not evolve.
The evolution of cooperation and quorum sensing
In the next series of simulations we allow cooperation and
quorum sensing to evolve simultaneously, and allowing mutations
at all three loci from inactive to functional and vice versa with
probability m=10
24. Fig. 2 shows as an example the evolution of
the genotype and allele frequencies in a run of the simulation
model with a high cost of cooperation and a relatively cheap
quorum sensing system (mC=30.0, mS=3.0, mR=1.0), medium
quorum threshold (ne=3), high cooperation reward (r=0.9) and
no diffusion (D=0.0).
The first invading genotype is the ‘‘Blunt’’ one (Csr) which
cooperates unconditionally but lacks QS. However, as soon as the
‘‘Blunt’’ type reaches a high frequency in the population, the
adoption of QS genes obviously becomes profitable, because the
‘‘Honest’’ (CSR) genotype takes over, ultimately excluding the
‘‘Blunt’’ one. The ‘‘Honest’’ takeover renders the stationary
population essentially dimorphic: the great majority of the
individuals are either ‘‘Ignorant’’ or ‘‘Honest’’. The remaining 6
genotypes are present at very low frequencies, close to their
metabolic mutation-selection equilibria. What we end up with is
thus the coexistence of cooperating-communicating cells (‘‘Hon-
est’’) and parasitic ones (‘‘Ignorant’’).
The effects of changing the quorum threshold and
diffusion
(1). Cooperation is costly (mC=30.0). Keeping the costs
mC, mS, mR and the cooperation reward r constant, we have
systematically screened the effects of the quorum threshold nq and
the diffusion parameter D on the evolution of cooperation and
quorum sensing (Fig. 3, left column). Comparison with the
corresponding cases without the possibility of QS (Fig. 1, left
column) immediately shows that the QS functions of signalling and
responding are selected in a large part of the parameter space and
that they have a positive effect on the relative frequency of
cooperation in the population.
First consider the case of a low quorum threshold (ne=2). If the
population is not mixed at all (D=0.0), cooperators do not need an
intact QS machinery to have a reliable cue on the presence of
cooperating neighbors: with a high chance at least one clone mate
(mother or daughter) is always around, and that is sufficient for
them to enjoy the cooperation reward during their next
interaction. This is why the great majority of cooperators have
disposed of one or both QS alleles (S and R)a tD=0.0. Most
cooperators are of the ‘‘Shy’’ (CsR) genotype, which responds to
quorum signals and cooperates accordingly, but does not itself
produce the signal. Parasites capitalize on this feature by issuing
the signal only, thereby persuading the ‘‘Shy’’ type to cooperate.
This results in the parasite population to become, to an
overwhelming majority, of the ‘‘Liar’’ (cSr) type which is the
exact complement of the ‘‘Shy’’ one: it possesses the only
functional allele that ‘‘Shy’’ is missing. Since the quorum signal
is necessary for the onset of cooperation in ‘‘Shy’’ individuals, the
interaction between these two dominant genotypes can be
interpreted both as parasitism and as a peculiar type of ‘‘division
of labour’’. The latter, less antagonistic component of the
interaction immediately disappears with the introduction of the
slightest diffusion into the system. At and above D=0.1, the
diffusion in the population creates already too many neighbor-
hoods that do not contain the required two C and two S alleles
distributed over separate genotypes (i.e two ‘‘Shy’’ and two ‘‘Liar’’
Cooperation and Cheating
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6655Figure 1. Stationary genotype distributions of the QS-disabled set of simulations. Fixed parameters: basic metabolic burden: M0=100.0;
metabolic cost of quorum signal production: ms=3.0; metabolic cost of quorum signal response: mr=1.0; fitness reward factor: r=0.9; mutation rates:
ms=mr=0.0, mc=10
24. Screened parameters: metabolic cost of cooperation (mc), quorum threshold (ne) and dispersal (D). Simulations lasted for
10.000 generations and they were initiated with the ‘‘All-Ignorant’’ (csr) state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006655.g001
Cooperation and Cheating
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6655types), and the presence of CSR (‘‘Honest’’) is selected,
guaranteeing successful cooperation as soon as two such genotypes
are present in a neighborhood. This leaves ample space for csr
(‘‘Ignorant’’) parasites of course, which reach high frequencies.
This will be true even at fairly high diffusion rates.
The nq=3 case has already been described in some detail above
(Fig. 2). The special feature of this series of simulations is that the
QS system is always adopted by the cooperators, even without
diffusion. This might be accounted for by the fact that at about
50–60% (or less) of the population cooperating, the presence of 3
cooperators within a 9-individual neighbourhood is far from
guaranteed, making QS well worth its cost for the cooperators.
Therefore both QS alleles (S and R) spread and become
established within the cooperating population. Consequently
parasites do not need to issue fake quorum signals to access the
benefit. Increasing diffusion gradually reduces the likelihood of
maintaining three cooperators in a neighbourhood, resulting in a
lower level of cooperation in the population. At very intensive
diffusion (D=6.0 in this parameter setting) both cooperation and
QS disappear together abruptly, and the stage is left for the
parasitic ‘‘Ignorant’’ type. Apparently then successful cooperation
will be so rare that cooperators are losing more due to the cost of
operating the QS machinery, than gaining from the cooperation
benefit. Consequently, their relative fitness shrinks below that of
the ‘‘Ignorant’’ type, and they vanish.
The nq=4, 5 and 6 cases are similar to the nq=3 case, except for
two important aspects. One is that, due to the high quorum
threshold, the system becomes more sensitive to spatial mixing.
For nq=4, the upper limit of the diffusion parameter that still
allows the cooperation and QS alleles to persist is D=0.5; for
nq=5 it is D=0.2 and for nq=6 cooperation is only maintained in
the absence of spatial mixing (D=0). Above these D values,
successfully cooperating clumps (neighbourhoods with nq or more
cooperators) are disintegrated by too intensive mixing, at a rate
faster than they are built by interactions. Second, at zero diffusion
(D=0.0), for nq=4, 5 and 6, cooperators increase in abundance
and they tend to lose one or both components of the QS system,
unlike in the nq=3 simulation. The reason for the loss of the
communication device is that cooperators become so common,
that QS is no longer needed to find out whether there is a sufficient
number of cooperators present in the immediate neighbourhood.
Constitutively cooperating genotypes like ‘‘Blunt’’ and ‘‘Vain’’
increase in frequency because they do not pay the (complete) cost
of QS. At nq=4 the ‘‘Honest’’ type is maintained at about 30%,
because QS is still sufficiently often useful, with almost 30% of the
population consisting of non-cooperators. Here most of the non-
cooperating strains are of the ‘‘Liar’’ type: in neighborhoods with
fewer than nq=4 ‘‘Honest’’ individuals, their signalling helps to
persuade the latter to cooperate. At nq=5 and nq=6 with zero
diffusion, the simulations bring an interesting strategic aspect of
QS to the light. Although almost 100% of the population is
cooperating, the fully quorum sensing ‘‘Honest’’ type is main-
tained at some 30–50% of the population. This is at first sight
surprising, since the presence in local neighborhoods of a quorum
Figure 2. Details of a single QS-enabled simulation. Parameters as in Fig. 1, except for ms=mr=10
24; mc=30.0, ne=3 and D=0.0. Time
evolution of A.: genotype frequencies; B.: genotype distribution; C.: allele frequencies. D.: The spatial pattern of genotypes at T=10.000.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006655.g002
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24.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006655.g003
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appears to function as a mechanism to avoid expression of the
cooperative behavior when already a sufficient number of
unconditionally cooperating (‘‘Blunt’’) neighbors are producing
the public good. Clearly, when less then nq cells in a neighbour-
hood are producing the quorum signal molecule, ‘‘Honest’’ types
will not cooperate, thus saving the cost of cooperation while
frequently enjoying the cooperation benefit thanks to their
unconditionally cooperating neighbors. This explains the fairly
high frequency of signalling unconditional cooperators (‘‘Vains’’).
By enhancing the local concentration of the quorum signal they
induce ‘‘Honest’’ cells to cooperate, thereby enhancing the
likelihood that a quorum of cooperators is reached. Actually, in
situations where cooperation is so attractive that the C allele is
(almost) fixed, the three cooperating types: ‘‘Honest’’, ‘‘Blunt’’ and
‘‘Vain’’ display a cyclic interaction pattern (Blunt.Vain.Ho-
nest.Blunt) reminiscent of the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game
[20,21]. A population of ‘‘Blunt’’ is invaded by ‘‘Honest’’ because
– as explained above – ‘‘Honest’’ parasitizes on the unconditional
cooperation by the ‘‘Blunts’’. Conversely, an ‘‘Honest’’ population
is invaded by ‘‘Blunt’’ and by ‘‘Vain’’, because they do not pay
(part of) the costs of the QS machinery, and ‘‘Vain’’ invades a
polymorphic (‘‘Honest’’, ‘‘Blunt’’) population, enhancing the
likelihood of a quorum of actual cooperators by inducing
‘‘Honest’’ cells. Fig. 4 shows the evolutionary dynamics of such
a population with the cooperating C allele fixed.
(2). Cooperation is relatively cheap (mC=10.0). The
right column in Fig. 3 shows the simulation results for less costly
cooperation. Just as in the case of costly cooperation, QS alleles
are selected in a large part of the parameter space and boost the
frequency of cooperators in the population (compare with Fig. 1,
right column). In particular, QS enables the maintenance of
cooperative behavior at higher levels of population mixing. At low
quorum thresholds (nq=2 and nq=3) and a low rate of diffusion,
the QS machinery is too expensive because sufficiently often
neighborhoods will contain a quorum of unconditional
cooperators, and the QS alleles are not selected. When the rate
of spatial mixing increases, the predictability of the local
population composition goes down, and QS becomes profitable.
At higher quorum thresholds (nq$4), we see again that if the
population (almost) exclusively consists of (potential) cooperators,
QS is selected because its machinery allows cells to avoid
cooperating when the number of unconditionally cooperating
neighbors is already equal to or higher than the quorum. The
resulting cooperating population consists of a dynamical
coexistence of fully quorum sensing (‘‘Honest’’) genotypes,
unconditionally cooperators (‘‘Blunt’’ types) and signalling
unconditionally cooperators (‘‘Vains’’).
The effect of decreasing the reward of cooperation
At a lower cooperation reward of r=0.5 neither cooperation nor
quorum sensing evolves: the population becomes almost completely
uniform‘‘Ignorant’’ withinthe entire parameter space.Thisresult is
somewhat surprising, given that at r=0.5, successful quorum
sensing cooperators like the ‘‘Honest’’ genotype should still enjoy a
substantial fitness advantage compared to the ‘‘Ignorant’’. The total
metabolic burden of an ‘‘Honest’’ individual after getting the
cooperation reward is 133.0 * 0.5=66.5, whereas the ‘‘Ignorant’’
carries a burden of 100.0 units, i.e., the cooperator should have a
fitness advantage of about 34% over the parasite. It cannot use it to
the full, however, because nearby parasites may take the advantage
as well without paying the costs, and those parasites which are
successful in doing so carry an even lower (50.0 units) metabolic
burden. Apparently a minimumthreshold measure of fitness reward
is necessary for cooperation to become an option. With the quorum
threshold fixed at nq=3 and diffusion at D=0.0, we looked for the
critical value of the fitness reward by increasing r from 0.5 to 0.9,
and found it to be rc=0.8. This means that the kind of exploitable,
broadcasted cooperation, such as producing a public good needs to
be highly rewarded for it to be worthwhile to adopt, otherwise
parasitism prevails and ultimately eradicates cooperation.
Discussion
Microorganisms display a wide range of social behaviors, such as
swarming motility, virulence, biofilm formation, foraging and
‘chemical warfare’ [7,21,8,9,10]. These social behaviors involve
cooperation and communication. Cooperation often takes the form
of a coordinated production and excretion of molecules like
enzymes, toxins and virulence factors. In bacteria, this cooperative
behavior is typically regulated by quorum sensing (QS), a chemical
communication system in which cells produce diffusible molecules
and can assess the cell density by sensing the local concentration of
these signaling molecules [11,12,22,23]. In fact, QS can be viewed
Figure 4. The evolution of QS in a population with the cooperating C allele fixed. Parameters as in Fig. 3, with ne=6 and D=0.2. The
simulation was started from the ‘‘All-Blunt’’ initial state.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006655.g004
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behavior. An important issue is the evolutionary stability of
cooperation because of its potential vulnerability to social cheating:
the occurrence and selection of individuals who gain the benefit of
cooperation without paying their share of the costs [2,10]. We
studied the evolution of cooperative behavior in bacteria (e.g.
production of a public good) and of a QS system which coordinates
this cooperative behavior, using cellular automaton (CA) modeling.
Thisapproachallowsafairlypreciseevaluationoftheroleplayedby
the spatial population structure, because all bacterial interactions
are supposed to occur between neighboring cells.
Our results allow three main conclusions, which we discuss in
turn.
1. Cooperation only evolves under conditions of limited
dispersal
The simulations in which we analysed the evolution of
cooperation without QS suggest that cooperation can only evolve
when the degree of spatial mixing in the population is low, which
implies a high relatedness between neighboring cells. Our model
thus confirms the importance of the level of relatedness between
interacting individuals and the evolutionary stability of coopera-
tion, as first hypothesized by Hamilton (Hamilton 1964), and
demonstrated experimentally in microbial populations [24,25,26].
The level of exploitation of cooperative behavior by non-
cooperating strains is lowest when the required quorum of
cooperators is relatively high and the dispersal rate is low (Fig. 1).
2. The presence of cooperative strains in a population
always selects for QS and cooperation becomes more
common as a consequence of QS
The simulations in which we allow the simultaneous evolution
of cooperation and QS suggest that whenever the gene for
cooperation is selected, also one or both of the communication
genes of the QS system are selected. Moreover, the presence of QS
(either partial or complete) allows stable levels of cooperation in
regions of the explored parameter space where cooperation
without QS cannot invade (compare the corresponding columns
in Fig. 1 and Fig. 3). Thus a communication system helps to
establish stable cooperation. Of course, communication about
willingness to cooperate will only be selected if at least part of the
population is able to cooperate, so evolution of QS is not expected
in a completely non-cooperating population. But it is not self-
evident that QS always should enhance the frequency of
cooperating strains in the population. Clearly, QS by cooperative
strains is selected if the advantage derived from limiting the actual
cooperative behavior to when it is most profitable outweighs its
costs. In this way QS causes the gene for cooperation to increase.
But QS genes may also be selected in non-cooperators, allowing
exploitation of cooperative strains and lowering the frequency of
cooperation. This applies in particular to ‘‘Liar’’ strains, non-
cooperators which signal willingness to cooperate, which may
manipulate fully quorum sensing ‘‘Honest’’ strains to cooperate
when actually the number of local cooperators falls below the
quorum nq. As a consequence, these ‘‘Honest’’ cells pay the cost of
cooperation but cannot enjoy its benefit.
3. The communication – cooperation system as modeled
in this study displays a remarkably rich and complex
pattern of social interactions in which cheating and
exploitation play a significant role
QS not only leads to a higher equilibrium frequency of the
cooperation gene, but also allows a striking diversity of social
interactions. Of the 8 possible genotypes in our model, defined by
the presence/absence of the three functional genes for resp.
cooperation, signaling and responding, 6 genotypes may reach
appreciable equilibrium frequencies, depending on the precise
parameter combinations. Only two mutant types play an
insignificant role in the system: ‘‘Voyeur’’ which responds to the
signal but is unable to signal and cooperate itself, and ‘‘Lame’’,
which is fully quorum sensing (signaling and responding) but
cannot cooperate. Inspection of Fig. 3 reveals the possibility of 5
different stable polymorhisms characterized by domination of two
genotypes: [Blunt,Ignorant], [Blunt,Honest], [Shy,Liar], [Honest,-
Ignorant] [Honest,Vain]; 5 polymorphisms with three dominating
genotypes: [Honest, Blunt, Ignorant], [Honest, Blunt, Liar],
[Honest, Ignorant, Liar], [Honest, Vain, Blunt], [Shy, Liar,
Blunt] and one in which four genotypes reach an appreciable
frequency: [Honest, Blunt, Liar, Ignorant]. It is important to note
that in all cases some degree of social cheating occurs in the form
of exploitation or parasitism. Thus our analysis predicts the large-
scale occurrence of social cheating in microbial populations.
Two of the polymorphisms mentioned above merit more
elaborate discussion.
The Janus head of QS
In cases where the cooperation gene is (almost) fixed, one might
at first sight expect a monomorphic unconditionally cooperating
(‘‘Blunt’’) population, because Blunt is the cooperator with the
lowest metabolic costs, and in a fully cooperating population QS is
not needed to obtain information about the potential level of
cooperation. However, we find next to ‘‘Blunt’’ appreciable
frequencies of fully quorum sensing (‘‘Honest’’) and partially
quorum sensing (‘‘Vain’’) cells. The reason appears to be that here
QS is selected because it allows exploitation of Blunt strains, which
unconditionally cooperate. As soon as a quorum of Blunts is
present, the other cells need not cooperate themselves in order to
profit from the cooperation benefit. Adoption of the QS
machinery allows them to do precisely this, since in such cases
the level of signal is too low to trigger their cooperative behavior.
This phenomenon is an unexpected and novel result, showing that
QS not only prevents wasting resources when too few potential
cooperators are around, but also allows cells to parasitize on
unconditionally cooperating neighbors, when a sufficient number
of those are present. It may occur at a large scale when the gene
for cooperation is (almost) fixed in the population, due to a
favorable benefit/cost ratio of the cooperative behavior and the
quorum threshold relatively high. As explained more fully in the
Results section, 100% cooperating populations seem to evolve in
most cases to a [Blunt, Honest, Vain] mixture, characterized by a
cyclic interaction pattern (Blunt.Vain.Honest.Blunt) reminis-
cent of the rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game [20,21].
Spiteful behavior
The second polymorphism we want to call attention to is the
coexistence of Honest, Liar and Ignorant, which occurs e.g. at
nq=4 and nq=5 for certain diffusion values. Clearly, the non-
cooperative Ignorant and Liar cells exploit the Honest cells which
provide cooperation benefits. Here the selective advantage of Liar
is at first sight remarkable, since it pays a higher metabolic cost
than Ignorant, and can only expect the same share as Ignorant
from the cooperation benefit made available by the Honest cells.
The only effect of Liar is to sometimes induce Honest cells to
cooperate when actually less than the quorum of Honest is present.
Nothing is gained, except that in such cases Honest is paying the
cooperation cost without getting the benefit. Thus this coexistence
is a clear example of spiteful behavior. Liar lowers the relative
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How do our results relate to previous theoretical and empirical
work on the evolution of quorum sensing and cooperation? They
confirm the basic result from earlier theoretical analyses of the
evolution of QS [15], which predicted a stable polymorphism in
microbial populations between Qs and non-QS strains. The
conclusion of Brown and Johnstone that the highest level of QS
signal expression is expected for intermediate levels of relatedness
between interacting strains [16] is confirmed in our study only for
cases when the cooperation cost is low and the required quorum
threshold is also low. Then the benefit of cooperation is relatively
easy to obtain, and the QS machinery is too costly to operate.
Only when the spatial population mixing becomes more intensive,
causing the predictability of the neighborhood composition to go
down, QS becomes profitable. The situation is different for costly
cooperation and/or a high quorum threshold. Apparently, then
QS is profitable even at a very low rate of dispersal (i.e., at high
relatedness between interacting cells) because of the lower level of
cooperation in the population and/or the greater sensitiveness to
increased dispersal.
The available empirical observations on natural occurrence of
QS cheats are mainly from work on Pseudomonas aeruginosa:
[27,13,28,29,30,31]. Although these experimental studies cannot
yet be informative with respect to the full spectrum of possible
mutants and only focus on one or two QS mutants, they report a
considerable level of social cheating, which is in agreement with
our study.
Finally, we mention an experimental result that may be of
relevance with respect to QS evolution but is not included in this
model. It is related to the feedback-regulation of QS signal
production: ‘‘signal deaf’’ signaler mutants (in our notation:.Sr
genotypes) are shown to produce an excess of signal molecules
compared to signal responsive ones, because in the latter signal
production is downregulated by the extracellular concentration of
the signal itself, which response-deficient mutants cannot sense
[32,33]. The effect of signal over-expression on the dynamics of
QS evolution require further theoretical work.
In conclusion, we predict that the evolution of QS as a
communication system regulating cooperative behavior such as
the production of a public good has two striking effects. First, it
enables the cooperative behavior to attain a higher frequency in
the population, and second, it opens up a remarkably rich
repertoire of social interactions in which cheating and exploitation
are commonplace.
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